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Abstract
We establish laws of large numbers for comparing sums of i.i.d. random variables
in terms of stochastic dominance. Our results shed new light on a classic question,
raised first by Samuelson (1963), on the relation between expected utility, risk aversion,
and the aggregation of independent risks. In the context of statistical experiments,
we answer a long-standing open question posed by Blackwell (1951): we show that
generically, an experiment is more informative than another in large samples if and
only if it has higher Rényi divergences.
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2
1 Introduction
The law of large numbers connects the long-run frequency of an event to its likelihood, and
has been one of the first principles giving practical meaning to the notion of probability. It
also guides our intuition in decision problems that involve multiple independent risks, as
in the case of a physician treating multiple patients, or of an investor managing a large
portfolio of assets.
While the law of large numbers provides exact predictions about limiting frequencies,
it does not provide precise indications to decision makers who are concerned with the
problem of choosing between risky prospects, even when these prospects are obtained by
aggregating a large number of i.i.d. risks.
This view was articulated by Samuelson (1963), who asked under what conditions an
agent could reject a gamble, but accept n independent copies of it. Samuelson deemed as
inconsistent the behavior of a decision maker who is willing to accept n copies of a lottery
but not one, and attributed this choice reversal to a naive interpretation of the law of
large numbers. The critical point in Samuelson’s argument is that whenever a gamble X
with positive expectation is aggregated into an in i.i.d. sum X1 + · · ·+Xn consisting of
n independent copies of X, two effects come into play. The law of large numbers implies
that the probability of incurring losses vanishes for large n. At the same time, combining
multiple risks exposes the decision maker to unlikely, but potentially large, losses. Since
the law of large numbers does not provide information about the odds of these rare but
large deviations, it is therefore insufficient as a guide for action.
In this paper we establish new laws of large numbers for comparing sums of i.i.d. random
variable in terms of stochastic dominance. We say that a random variable X first-order
dominates a random variables Y in the aggregate if for large n, the sum X1 + · · · + Xn
of n i.i.d. copies of X stochastically dominates the sum of n i.i.d. copies of Y . Stochastic
dominance in the aggregate is implied, but strictly weaker than, stochastic dominance
between X and Y .
Our first main result, Theorem 1, provides a characterization of aggregate stochastic
dominance which renders this notion operational. For a generic pair of bounded random
variables X and Y , we show that X strictly dominates Y in the aggregate if and only if
E [X] > E [Y ] and, for all t 6= 0, it holds that
1
t
logE
[
etX
]
>
1
t
logE
[
etY
]
. (1)
Equivalently, if and only if every decision maker endowed with CARA utility prefers X
over Y . The proof relies on large deviation results that provide sharp tail estimates for
sums of i.i.d. random variables in terms of their moment generating functions, resulting in
condition (1).
We focus on stochastic dominance for its many applications, both in the theory of risk
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and in other fields, as well as for its conceptual simplicity. In the same way the classic law
of large numbers provides nonparametric predictions about long-run frequencies, stochastic
dominance provides unambiguous choice predictions that are independent of the decision
maker’s preferences.
In the second part of the paper, we apply aggregate stochastic dominance to Blackwell’s
theory of comparison of experiments. Experiments form a general framework for modeling
information: Given a set Θ of parameters, an experiment P produces an observation
distributed according to Pθ, given the true parameter value θ ∈ Θ. Blackwell’s celebrated
theorem (Blackwell, 1951) provides a partial order for comparing experiments in terms of
their informativeness.
As is well known, requiring two experiments to be ranked in the Blackwell order is a
demanding condition. Consider the problem of testing a binary hypothesis θ ∈ {0, 1}, based
on random samples drawn from one of two experiments P or Q. According to Blackwell’s
ordering, P is more informative than Q if, for every test performed based on observations
produced by Q, there exists another test based on P that has lower probabilities of both
Type-I and Type-II errors. This is a strong notion of informativeness which needs to apply
if only one sample is produced by each experiment.
In many applications, the information produced by an experiment does not consist of a
single observation but of multiple i.i.d. samples. We study a weakening of the Blackwell
order that is appropriate for comparing experiments in terms of their large sample properties.
Our starting point is the question, first posed by Blackwell (1951), of whether it is possible
for n independent observations from an experiment P to be more informative than n
observations from another experiment Q, even though P and Q are not comparable in the
Blackwell order. The question was answered in the affirmative by Torgersen (1970) and
Azrieli (2014). However, identifying the precise conditions under which this phenomenon
can occur has remained an open problem.
We say that P dominates Q in large samples if for every n large enough, n independent
observations from P are more informative, in the Blackwell order, than n independent
observations from Q. We focus on a binary set of parameters Θ = {0, 1}, and show that
generically P dominates Q in large samples if and only if the first is more informative in
terms of Rényi divergences (Theorem 2). Rényi divergences are a one-parameter family of
measures of informativeness for experiments; introduced and characterized axiomatically in
Rényi (1961), we show that they capture the asymptotic informativeness of an experiment.
The result crucially relies on the characterization of aggregate stochastic dominance: We
associate to each experiment a new statistic (“the perfected log-likelihood ratio”) and show
that the comparison of these statistics in terms of first-order stochastic dominance is in
fact equivalent to the Blackwell order.
In the last part of the paper we study risk aversion. The notion of aggregate stochastic
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dominance can be modified, in an obvious way, to be applied to second-order stochastic
dominance. We characterize the resulting order in terms of the unanimous rankings of
risk-averse CARA preferences and the opposite rankings of risk-loving CARA preferences
(Theorems 3 and 4).
These results have two further implications. First, we show that if the i.i.d. sums of
two gambles X and Y are ordered in terms of third, fourth, or higher-order stochastic
dominance, then given a large enough number of repetitions they are also ordered in terms
of second-order stochastic dominance. Thus, higher-order attitudes over risk (e.g. prudence,
temperance, etc.) reduce to simple risk aversion when considering i.i.d. sums of gambles.
The second conclusion is that only a specific class of expected utility preferences are
monotone with respect to second-order aggregate dominance: those utility functions that
are mixtures of CARA utilities, also known as mixed risk-averse preferences. This is a
large class which contains many utility functions used in applications, and for which our
results provide a novel behavioral characterization.
The paper is organized as follows. In §2 we study first-order stochastic dominance in
the aggregate. In §3 we turn to Blackwell experiments. In §4 we analyze second- and
higher-order aggregate dominance. Finally, we further discuss our results and their relation
to the literature in §5.
2 Aggregate Stochastic Dominance
2.1 Definition
A random variable X dominates another random variable Y in first-order stochastic
dominance, denoted X ≥1 Y , if it holds that E [φ(X)] ≥ E [φ(Y )] for all increasing
functions φ for which the expectations are well defined. Given a bounded random variable
X we denote by max[X] = min{a : P [X ≤ a] = 1} the essential maximum of X; this is
the maximum of the support of its distribution. We define min[X] analogously.1
The next definition is central to the paper. It introduces a notion of stochastic
dominance for sums of i.i.d. random variables:
Definition 1. Let X and Y be random variables, and let (Xi) and (Yi) be i.i.d. copies of
X and Y , respectively. The random variable X first-order dominates Y in the aggregate if
for all n large enough,
X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥1 Y1 + · · ·+ Yn. (2)
In §4 we extend the definition to second and higher-order stochastic dominance, thereby
capturing risk aversion as well as more nuanced risk attitudes.
1That is, min[X] = max{a : P [X ≥ a] = 1}
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There is an important contrast between aggregate stochastic dominance and traditional
limit theorems for sums of i.i.d. variables. For example, the weak Law of Large Numbers
implies that asymptotically the sum∑ni=1Xi will take values close to n·E [X]. In particular,
if E [X] > E [Y ] then for all n large enough and any value a between E [X] and E [Y ],
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na]. (3)
In comparison, first-order dominance in the aggregate is tantamount to requiring that for
all n large enough the inequality (3) holds for all values a ∈ R, in particular, for values
of a that lie outside the interval (E [Y ],E [X]) and correspond to unlikely, but potentially
large, losses or gains. As emphasized in the introduction, the decisions of economic agents
who are not risk neutral can crucially depend on the probabilities of these rare outcomes.
Now consider the strong Law of Large Numbers. It is equivalent to the statement that
if E [X] > E [Y ], then there exists a random variable N such that almost surely
X1 + · · ·+Xn > Y1 + · · ·+ Yn (4)
for all n > N . Since the exact value of n for which (4) holds is not known ex-ante, this
conclusion does not provide clear guidance in comparing the two sums∑ni=1Xi and∑ni=1 Yi,
even for large n. In comparison, X first-order dominates Y in the aggregate if and only if
for all n large enough there is some coupling of the i.i.d. sequences (Xi)ni=1 and (Yi)ni=1
with the property that (4) holds almost surely.2
It is well-known that aggregate stochastic dominance is implied by stochastic dominance.
In fact if X ≥1 Y then ∑ni=1Xi ≥1 ∑ni=1 Yi for any number n of i.i.d. replicas of the two
random variables.3 As we show in the next example, the converse implication is not true.
2.2 Example
We now illustrate a simple example of two random variables that are not comparable in
terms of stochastic dominance, but can be ranked with respect to aggregate stochastic
dominance. Let X be a lottery that pays 1 or 0 with probability 1/2, and let Y be
distributed uniformly over [−1/5, 4/5].
For example, X might correspond to an Arrow-Debreu security, while Y might corre-
spond to an insurance contract that costs 1/5 and offers a smoothed distribution of payoff
2A coupling of two random variables X and Y is a pair of random variables X ′ and Y ’ such that X
and X ′ have the same distribution, as do Y and Y ′, but where the joint distribution of the pairs is not
necessarily equal; by abuse of notation it is often convenient to refer to the new pair also as X and Y .
First-order stochastic dominance admits a simple definition in terms of couplings: X ≥1 Y if and only if
there is some coupling of this pair such that almost surely X ≥ Y . Likewise, X ≥2 Y if there is a coupling
such that almost surely X ≥ E [Y |X].
3This follows from the coupling characterization of first-order stochastic dominance. A different proof is
provided in Lemma 6 in the appendix.
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that is uniform on the unit interval. The cumulative distribution functions of X and Y are
depicted in Figure 1, from which it is clear that neither first-order dominates the other.
In fact, the two distributions are not ranked in terms of second-order stochastic
dominance either. To see this, note that Y has higher expected utility than X for the
utility function given by u(x) = x for x ≤ 1/5 and u(x) = 1/5 otherwise. It is also clear
that Y does not dominate X, since the latter has higher expectation.
-0.5 0.5 1.0 1.5
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Figure 1: The CDFs of X and Y , in blue and orange, respectively.
It will be an implication of our characterization theorem that X first-order dominates
Y in the aggregate. In this example, it is not difficult to verify that replicating the two
gambles makes it possible to rank them in terms of stochastic dominance: Figure 2 shows
the cumulative distribution functions of the two sums X1 + · · · + Xn and Y1 + · · · + Yn
when setting n = 35, from which it is apparent that the first sum dominates the second
one in terms of first-order stochastic dominance.
2.3 Characterization
In this section we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for aggregate stochastic
dominance. To each bounded random variable X we associate the function LX : R→ R
5 10 15 20 25 30
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Figure 2: The CDFs of X1 + · · ·+Xn and Y1 + · · ·+ Yn, for n = 35, in blue and orange,
respectively.
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defined as
LX(t) =
1
t
logE
[
etX
]
(5)
for all t 6= 0, and, to guarantee continuity,
LX(0) = E [X]. (6)
If X is a gamble, then LX(t) is the certainty equivalent that a decision maker ascribes to
X, under expected utility and a utility function u whose coefficient of absolute risk aversion
is constant and equal to −t.4 Note that for t positive, such a decision maker is in fact
risk-loving; we include these agents for the analysis of first-order stochastic dominance.
The quantity LX is a standard tool in the theory of choice under risk, finance, probability
theory, and other fields. Because it amounts to a simple normalization of the moment
generating function of X, the certainty equivalent LX is known or can be easily computed
for most families of distributions commonly used in applications.
Our first main result is a characterization of aggregate stochastic dominance under a
mild genericity assumptions. We say that a pair (X,Y ) is generic if min[X] 6= min[Y ] and
max[X] 6= max[Y ].
Theorem 1. Let X and Y be a generic pair of bounded random variables. Then the
following are equivalent:
(i). LX(t) > LY (t) for all t ∈ R,
(ii). X first-order dominates Y in the aggregate.
Aggregate stochastic dominance ties two fundamental ideas in the theory of risk:
stochastic dominance and the aggregation of independent risks. Theorem 1 establishes a
equivalence between this notion and an elementary and well-known class of preferences.
Whenever, as described by (i), all agents with CARA preferences unanimously prefer X over
Y , then, for a large enough number of repetitions, all agents with monotone preferences
will agree on this ranking. Moreover, this condition is both sufficient and necessary.
Stochastic dominance is a central tool for the nonparametric comparison of distributions,
and its relevance extends to fields such as information economics, statistics, and operations
research. Thus, Theorem 1 might have applications that extend beyond the theory of risk.
Indeed, in §3 we apply the characterization of Theorem 1 to the comparison of repeated
statistical experiments.
Figure 3 shows a simple instance of this equivalence. It depicts the certainty equivalents
LX and LY for the two gambles introduced in our earlier example in §2.2. As shown in the
4The (increasing) utility function is u(x) = etx for t positive, u(x) = −etx for t negative and u(x) = x
for t = 0.
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figure and can be verified analytically, the certainty equivalent of X is uniformly above that
of Y . More generally, for many known classes of distributions (e.g. exponential families)
moment generating functions have tractable closed form expressions, making aggregate
stochastic dominance an operational stochastic order.
It seems difficult to obtain an applicable characterization of aggregate stochastic
dominance without imposing any genericity conditions. In §F in the appendix we discuss
the knife-edge case where the maxima or the minima of the supports might be equal, and
show that the conclusions of Theorem 1 no longer hold. Indeed, in this knife-edge case
verifying aggregate stochastic dominance involves checking for combinatorial conditions that,
compared to (i) in Theorem 1, are less immediate to verify. Our genericity assumption plays
an additional role. A key tool in the application of a stochastic order is a characterization
in terms of a generator: a class V of functions such that X dominates Y if and only if
E [φ(X)] ≥ E [φ(Y )] for every φ ∈ V . The result in §F shows that without our genericity
assumption, aggregate stochastic dominance does not admit a generator.
-20 -10 10 20
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Figure 3: LX and LY in the example of §2.2, in blue and orange, respectively.
2.4 Proof Sketch
That (ii) implies (i) is intuitive and follows from a logic that can already be found in
Samuelson (1963). The key observation is under constant absolute risk aversion the
certainty equivalent of a sum X + Z of two independent gambles is the sum of the two
certainty equivalents. That is, LX+Z(t) = LX(t) + LZ(t) for every t. In particular, the
certainty equivalent of n independent copies of X is equal to n · LX(t). As a consequence,
X1 + · · ·+Xn dominates Y1 + · · ·+Yn in first-order stochastic dominance for some number
n of repetitions only if LX(t) ≥ LY (t).
The converse implication is more involved and is the technical core of the paper. Assume
(i) holds. The fact that LX(0) > LY (0), equivalently E [X] > E [Y ], guarantees that the
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dominance condition
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na]. (7)
holds with respect to all values of a that lie between E [X] and E [Y ]. This is established by
applying the Berry-Esseen Theorem, a uniform version of the Central Limit Theorem. The
main step in the proof Theorem 1 uses large-deviations techniques to obtain lower and upper
bounds on the probabilities of the events {X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na} and {Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na}
for the remaining values of a.
Large deviation theory studies low probability events, and in particular the odds with
which an i.i.d. sum deviates from its expectation. The Law of Large Numbers implies that
the probability of the event {X1 + · · · + Xn ≥ na} is low for a > E [X] and large n. A
crucial insight due to Cramér (1938) is that the order of magnitude of the probability of this
event is determined by the behavior of the moment generating function MX(t) = E
[
etX
]
.
Condition (i) in Theorem 1 implies that the moment generating functions satisfy
MX(t) > MY (t) for all t > 0. In the proof we show how this property, in turn, implies that
the dominance condition (7) holds for all a > E [X]. Similarly, condition (i) for negative
values of t implies MX(t) < MY (t) for all t < 0, and that the dominance condition (7)
holds for all a < E [Y ].
The key difficulty is in obtaining bounds that allow, for a fixed n, a comparison between
the two probabilities in (7) over a whole interval of values for a. This requires a careful
application of uniform large deviation theorems due to Bahadur and Rao (1960) and Petrov
(1965).
3 Blackwell Dominance in Large Samples
In this section we apply our characterization of aggregate stochastic dominance to the
comparison of statistical experiments.
3.1 Statistical Experiments
A state of the world θ can take two possible values, 0 or 1. A Blackwell-Le Cam experiment
P = (Ω, P0, P1) consists of a sample space Ω and a pair of probability measures (P0, P1)
defined on a σ-algebraA of subsets of Ω, with the interpretation that Pθ(A) is the probability
of observing A ∈ A in state θ ∈ {0, 1}. To ease the exposition we will suppress the σ-algebra
A from the notation. This framework is commonly encountered in simple hypothesis tests
as well as in information economics. In §5 we discuss the case of experiments for more
than two states.
We restrict attention to experiments where the measures P0 and P1 are mutually
absolutely continuous, so that no signal realization ω ∈ Ω perfectly reveals either state.
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Given two experiments P = (Ω, P0, P1) and Q = (Ξ, Q0, Q1), we can form the product
experiment P ⊕Q given by
P ⊕Q = (Ω× Ξ, P0 ×Q0, P1 ×Q1).
where Pθ × Qθ, given θ ∈ {0, 1}, denotes the product of the two measures. Under the
experiment P ⊕ Q the realizations produced by P and Q are observed, and the two
observations are independent conditional on the state. For instance, if P and Q consist of
drawing samples from two different populations, then P ⊕Q consists of the joint experiment
where a sample from each population is drawn. We denote by
P⊕n = P ⊕ · · · ⊕ P
the n-fold product experiment where n conditionally independent observations are generated
according to the experiment P .
Consider now a Bayesian decision maker whose prior belief assigns probability 1/2 to
the state being 1. Fixing a uniform prior simplifies the discussion, but it is without loss
of generality. To each experiment P = (Ω, P0, P1) we can associate a Borel probability
measure pi over [0, 1] that represents the distribution over posterior beliefs induced by
the experiment. Formally, let p(ω) be the posterior belief that the state is 1 given the
realization ω:
p(ω) = `(ω)1 + `(ω) where `(ω) =
dP1
dP0
(ω).
and define, for every Borel B ⊆ [0, 1]
piθ(B) = Pθ ({ω : p(ω) ∈ B})
as the probability that the posterior belief will belong to B, given state θ. We then define
pi = (pi0 + pi1)/2 as the unconditional measure over posterior beliefs. We say that an
experiment P is trivial if P0 = P1, and bounded if the support of pi is strictly included in
(0, 1).
3.2 Blackwell Theory
We first review the main concepts behind Blackwell’s order over experiments (Bohnenblust,
Shapley, and Sherman, 1949; Blackwell, 1953). Consider two experiments P and Q and
their induced distribution over posterior beliefs denoted by pi and τ , respectively. The
experiment P Blackwell dominates Q, denoted P  Q, if∫ 1
0
v(p) dpi(p) ≥
∫ 1
0
v(p) dτ(p) (8)
for every continuous convex function v : (0, 1)→ R. We write P  Q if P  Q and Q 6 P .
So, P  Q if and only if (8) holds with a strict inequality whenever v is strictly convex.
11
As is well known, each convex function v can be seen as the indirect utility, or value
function, induced by some decision problem. That is, for each convex v there exists a set
of actions A and a utility function u defined on A× {0, 1} such that v(p) is the maximal
expected utility that a decision maker can obtain in such a decision problem given a belief
p. Hence, P  Q if and only if in any decision problem, a decision maker can obtain a
higher payoff by basing her action on experiment P rather than on the experiment Q.
Blackwell’s theorem shows that the order  can be equivalently defined by “garbling"
operations: Intuitively, P  Q if and only if the outcome of the experiment Q can be
generated from the experiment P by compounding the latter with additional noise, without
adding further information about the state.5
As discussed in the introduction, we are interested in understanding the large-sample
properties of the Blackwell order. This motivates the next definition.
Definition 2. An experiment P dominates an experiment Q in large samples if there
exists an N ∈ N such that
P⊕n  Q⊕n for every n ≥ N. (9)
This order was first defined by Azrieli (2014) under the terminology of eventual
sufficiency. The definition captures the informal notion that a large sample drawn from P
is more informative than an equally large sample drawn from Q, provided the sample size
is large enough. Consider, for instance, the case of hypothesis testing. The experiment P
dominates Q in the Blackwell order if and only if for every test based on Q there exists
a test based on P that has weakly lower probabilities of both Type-I and Type-II errors.
Definition 2 extends this notion to large samples, in line with the standard paradigm of
asymptotic statistics.
A natural alternative definition would require P⊕n  Q⊕n to hold for some n, but as
we show below the resulting order is equivalent under a mild genericity assumption.
3.3 Rényi Divergence and the Rényi Order
Our main result relates Blackwell dominance in large samples to a well-known notion
of informativeness due to Rényi (1961). Given an experiment (Ω, P0, P1), a state θ, and
parameter t > 0, the Rényi t-divergence is defined as
RθP (t) =
1
t− 1 log
∫ (dPθ
dP1−θ
(ω)
)t−1
dPθ
5Formally, given two experiments P = (Ω, P0, P1) and Q = (Ξ, Q0, Q1), P  Q iff there is a measurable
kernel (also known as “garbling”) σ : Ω → ∆(Ξ), where ∆(Ξ) is the set of probability measures over Ξ,
such that for every θ and every measurable A ⊆ Ω, Qθ(A) =
∫
σ(ω)(A)dPθ(ω). In other terms, there is a
(perhaps randomly chosen) measurable map f with the property that for both θ = 0 and θ = 1, if X is a
random quantity distributed according to Pθ then Y = f(X) is distributed according to Qθ.
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when t 6= 1, and, to ensure continuity,
RθP (1) =
∫
Ω
log dPθdP1−θ
(ω) dPθ(ω).
Equivalently, RθP (1) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the measures Pθ and P1−θ.
Intuitively, observing a sample realization for which the likelihood-ratio (dPθ/dP1−θ)(ω)
is high constitutes evidence that favors state θ over 1− θ. For instance, in case t = 2, a
higher value of RθP (2) describes an experiment that, in expectation, more strongly produces
evidence in favor of the state θ when this is the correct state. Varying the parameter t
allows to consider different moments for the distribution of likelihood ratios.
Rényi Order. We say that an experiment P dominates an experiment Q in the Rényi
order if it holds that
RθP (t) > RθQ(t)
for all θ ∈ {0, 1} and all t > 0. The Rényi order is a refinement of the (strict) Blackwell
order. In the proof of Theorem 2 below, we explicitly construct a one-parameter family of
decision problems with the property that dominance in the Rényi order is equivalent to
higher expected utility with respect to each decision problem in this family.
A simple calculation shows that if P = Q⊕ T is the product of two experiments, then
for every state θ,
RθP = RθQ +RθT
A key implication is that P dominates Q in the Rényi order if and only if the same
relation holds for their n-th fold repetitions P⊕n and Q⊕n, for any n. Hence, the Rényi
order compares experiments in terms of properties that are unaffected by the number of
repetitions. Because, in turn, the Rényi order refines the Blackwell order, it follows that
domination in the Rényi order is a necessary condition for domination in large samples.
3.4 Characterization
In analogy with our definition of a generic pair of random variables, we call two bounded
experiments P and Q generic if the essential maxima of the log-likelihood ratios log dP1dP0
and log dQ1dQ0 are different, and if their essential minima are also different.
Theorem 2. For a generic pair of bounded experiments P and Q, the following are
equivalent:
(i). P dominates Q in large samples.
(ii). P dominates Q in the Rényi order.
As for the case of Theorem 1, dominance in large samples becomes less immediate to
verify for non-generic pairs of experiments. In particular, while strict dominance in large
samples still implies dominance in the Rényi order, the converse is not true.
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3.5 Example
We apply Theorem 2 to revisit an example due to Azrieli (2014) and to complete his
analysis. The example provides a simple instance of two experiments that are not ranked
in Blackwell order but become so in large samples. Despite its simplicity, the analysis of
this example is not straightforward, as shown by Azrieli (2014). Part of the difficulty lies
in the fact that directly applying the definition of Blackwell order to repeated experiments
can lead to involved calculations. As we show below, applying the Rényi order greatly
simplifies the analysis, and elucidates the logic behind the example.
Consider the following two experiments P and Q, parametrized by β and α, respectively.
In each matrix, entries are conditional probabilities of observing each signal realization
given the state θ:
P :
θ x1 x2 x3
0 β 12
1
2 − β
1 12 − β 12 β
Q :
θ y1 y2
0 α 1− α
1 1− α α
The parameters satisfy 0 ≤ β ≤ 1/4 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2. The experiment Q is a
symmetric, binary experiment. The experiment P with probability 1/2 yields a completely
uninformative signal realization x2, and with probability 1/2 yields an observation from an-
other symmetric binary experiment. As shown by (Azrieli, 2014, Claim 1), the experiments
P and Q are not ranked in the Blackwell order for parameter values 2β < α < 1/4 + β.
Azrieli (2014) points out that a necessary condition for P to dominate Q in large
samples is that the Rényi divergences are ranked at 1/2, that is R1P (1/2) > R1Q(1/2).6
In addition, he conjectures it is also a sufficient condition, and proves it in the special
case of β = 0. We show that for the experiments in the example, the fact that the Rényi
divergences are ranked at 1/2 is enough to imply dominance in the Rényi order, and
therefore, by Theorem 2, dominance in large samples. This settles the above conjecture in
the affirmative.
Proposition 1. Suppose R1P (1/2) > R1Q(1/2). Then R1P (t) > R1Q(t) for all t > 0, hence
P dominates Q in large samples.
In the rest of this section, we illustrate the main ideas behind the proof of our
characterization in Theorem 2.
6As in his paper, this condition can be written in terms of the parameter values as√
α(1− α) >
√
β(12 − β) +
1
4 .
Thus, when α = 0.1 and β = 0 for example, the experiment P does not Blackwell dominate Q but does
dominate it in large samples, as shown by Azrieli (2014).
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3.6 Repeated Experiments and Log-Likelihood Ratios
The distribution over posteriors induced by a product experiment P⊕n can be difficult to
analyze directly. A more suitable approach consists in studying the distribution of the
induced log-likelihood ratio
log dPθdP1−θ
. (10)
As is well known, given a repeated experiment P⊕n = (Ωn, Pn0 , Pn1 ), its log-likelihood ratio
satisfies, for every realization ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn) in Ωn,
log dP
n
1
dPn0
(ω) =
n∑
i=1
log dP1dP0
(ωi)
and moreover the random variables
Xi(ω) = log
dP1
dP0
(ωi) i = 1, . . . , n
are i.i.d. under Pnθ , for θ ∈ {0, 1}. Focusing on the distributions of log-likelihood ratios will
allow us to reduce the study of repeated experiments to the study of sums of i.i.d. random
variables. We can then apply the results from §2.
3.7 From Blackwell Dominance to First-Order Stochastic Dominance
Our first result is a novel characterization of the Blackwell order expressed in terms of
the distributions of the log-likelihood ratios (10). Given two experiments P = (Ω, P0, P1)
and Q = (Ξ, Q0, Q1) we denote by Fθ and Gθ, respectively, the cumulative distribution
function of the log-likelihood ratios conditional on state θ. That is,
Fθ(a) = Pθ
({
log dPθdP1−θ
≤ a
})
a ∈ R, θ ∈ {0, 1} (11)
and Gθ, θ ∈ {0, 1}, are defined analogously using Qθ.
We associate to P a new quantity, which we call the perfected log-likelihood ratio of the
experiment. Define
L˜ = log dP1dP0
− E
where E is a random variable that, under P1, is independent from log(dP1/dP0) and
distributed according to an exponential distribution with support R+ and cdfH(x) = 1−e−x
for all x ≥ 0. We denote by F˜ the cumulative distribution function of L˜ under P1. That is,
F˜ (a) = P1({L˜ ≤ a}) for all a ∈ R.
More explicitly, F˜ is the convolution of the distribution F1 with the distribution of −E,
and thus can be defined as
F˜ (a) =
∫
R
(1−H(u− a))dF1(u) = F1(a) + ea
∫
(a,∞)
e−udF1(u). (12)
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The next result shows that the Blackwell order over experiments can be reduced to
first-order stochastic dominance of the corresponding perfected log-likelihood ratios:
Proposition 2. Let P and Q be two experiments, and let F˜ and G˜, respectively, be the
associated distributions of perfected log-likelihood ratios. Then
P  Q if and only if F˜ (a) ≤ G˜(a) for all a ∈ R.
Proof. Let pi and τ be the distributions over posterior beliefs induced by P and Q,
respectively. As is well known, Blackwell dominance is equivalent to the requirement that
pi is a mean-preserving spread of τ . Equivalently, the functions defined as
Λpi(p) =
∫ p
0
(p− q)dpi(q) and Λτ (p) =
∫ p
0
(p− q)dτ(q) (13)
should satisfy Λpi(p) ≥ Λτ (p) for every p ∈ (0, 1).
We now express (13) in terms of the distributions of log-likelihood ratios Fθ and Gθ.
We have
Λpi(p) = p
(
1
2 −
∫
(p,1]
1 dpi
)
−
∫ p
0
q dpi(q). (14)
Using the fact that q dpi(q) = 12 dpi1(q), 7 we obtain
2Λpi(p) = p
(
1−
∫
(p,1]
1
q
dpi1(q)
)
−
∫ p
0
dpi1(q).
A change of variable from posterior beliefs to log-likelihood ratios, letting a = log p1−p ,
implies
2Λpi(p) =
ea
1 + ea
(
1−
∫
(a,∞)
1 + eu
eu dF1(u)
)
− F1(a). (15)
Since ∫
(a,∞)
1 + eu
eu dF1(u) =
∫
(a,∞)
e−u dF1(u) + 1− F1(a),
(15) leads to
2(1 + ea)Λpi(p) = −F1(a)− ea
∫
(a,∞)
e−u dF1(u) = −F˜ (a),
where the final equality follows from (12). It then follows that P dominates Q if and only
if F˜ (a) ≤ G˜(a) for all a ∈ R, as desired.
Intuitively, transferring probability mass from lower to higher values of log(dPθ/dP1−θ)
leads to an experiment that, conditional on the state being θ, is more likely to shift
the decision maker’s beliefs towards the correct state. Hence, one might conjecture that
7See the appendix, equation (33), for a proof of this fact.
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Blackwell dominance of the experiments P and Q is related to, for example, first-order
stochastic dominance of the distributions Fθ and Gθ. However, not all distributions over R
can arise as the distribution of log-likelihood ratios of an experiment: Since the likelihood-
ratio dP1/dP0 must satisfy the change of measure identity
∫ dP0
dP1 dP1 = 1, the distributions
F1 must satisfy ∫
R
e−u dF1(u) = 1.
Because the function e−u is strictly decreasing, and the same identity must hold for G1,
it is then impossible for F1 to dominate G1 in terms of first-order stochastic dominance.
Since e−u is additionally strictly convex, it follows that F1 and G1 cannot be ranked with
respect to second-order stochastic dominance either.
Proposition 2 shows that subtracting an independent exponential term E from the
log-likelihood ratios of the two distributions leads to a formulation of the Blackwell order in
terms of first-order stochastic dominance.8 Despite the fact that Fθ cannot stochastically
dominate Gθ, the next lemma shows that when F1(a) is smaller that G1(a) for values of a
above some threshold, then F˜ (a) is smaller than G˜(a) within the same range. Likewise,
when F0(a) is smaller than G0(a) for large a, then F˜ (−a) is also smaller than G˜(−a). The
intuition is that a dominating experiment should have higher likelihood ratios for state θ,
conditional on θ.
Lemma 1. Consider two experiments P and Q. Let Fθ and Gθ, respectively, be the
distributions of the corresponding log-likelihood ratios, and F˜ and G˜ be the distributions of
the perfected log-likelihood ratios. For b ∈ R, the following hold:
(i). If F1(a) ≤ G1(a) for all a ≥ b, then F˜ (a) ≤ G˜(a) for all a ≥ b.
(ii). If F0(a) ≤ G0(a) for all a ≥ b, then F˜ (−a) ≤ G˜(−a) for all a ≥ b.
3.8 Rényi Order and Large Deviations
We now illustrate how dominance in the Rényi order translates into large-deviation
properties of the log-likelihood ratios, and provide a sketch of the proof of Theorem 2.
This proof will use as a crucial ingredient the following one-sided version of Theorem 1.
Proposition 3. Let X and Y be bounded random variables that satisfy max[X] 6= max[Y ]
and LX(t) > LY (t) for all t ≥ 0. Then there exists N such that for all n ≥ N and
a ≥ E [Y ],
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na]. (16)
8It might appear puzzling that two distributions F1 and G1 that are not ranked by stochastic dominance
become ranked after the addition of the same independent random variable. In a different context and
under different assumptions, the same phenomenon is studied by Pomatto, Strack, and Tamuz (2019).
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Consider two experiments P = (Ω, P0, P1) and Q = (Ξ, Q0, Q1), with the property that
P dominates Q in the Rényi order, and let
X = log dP1dP0
and Y = log dQ1dQ0
be the corresponding log-likelihood ratios. We are interested in their properties conditional
on θ = 1, and so treat X as a random variable defined on the probability space (Ω, P1),
and Y as defined on (Ξ, Q1), so that their distributions are F1 and G1, respectively.
It follows immediately from its definition that the Rényi divergence is formally related
to the certainty equivalent functional defined in (5) and (6). Indeed, for any t > 0,
R1P (t) = LX(t− 1) and R1Q(t) = LY (t− 1) (17)
and
R0P (t) = LX(1− t) and R0Q(t) = LY (1− t). (18)
Thus dominance in the Rényi order implies that
LX(t) > LY (t) for all t > −1.
If, in addition, P and Q form a generic pair, then we can conclude that X and Y satisfy
all the conditions of Proposition 3. Hence, letting (Xi) and (Yi) be i.i.d. copies of X and
Y , it follows that there exists a large enough N such that for for all n ≥ N and a ≥ E [Y ],
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na]. (19)
As discussed earlier, X1 + · · ·+Xn has the same distribution as the log-likelihood ratio
log(dPn1 /dPn0 ) of the repeated experiment. It follows, therefore, that the distribution F ∗n1
of log(dPn1 /dPn0 ) and the distribution G∗n1 of log(dQn1/dQn0 ) satisfy
F ∗n1 (na) ≤ G∗n1 (na) for all a ≥ E [Y ].
In turn, Lemma 1 implies that the distributions of the perfected log-likelihood ratios of
the two repeated experiments are ranked for all values above nE [Y ].
To compare these distributions at smaller values, we apply a similar argument to the
opposite pair of log-likelihood ratios log(dP0/dP1) and log(dQ0/dQ1). Combining both
parts allows us to conclude that the experiments are ranked in large samples. Details are
left to the appendix.
3.9 Connection to the Literature
Blackwell (1951, p.101) posed the question of whether dominance of two experiments is
equivalent to dominance of their n-fold repetitions. In the statistics literature, Torgersen
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(1970) provides an early example of two experiments that are not comparable in the
Blackwell order, but become so after a large enough number of repetitions.
Moscarini and Smith (2002) produce an alternative criterion for comparing repeated
experiments. According to their notion, an experiment P dominates an experiment Q if
for every decision problem with finitely many actions, there exists some N such that the
payoff achievable from P⊕n is higher than that from Q⊕n whenever n ≥ N . This order
is characterized by the efficiency index of an experiment, defined, in our notation, as the
minimum over θ and t of the function (t− 1)RθP (t).
While in Moscarini and Smith (2002) the number n of repetitions is allowed to depend
on the decision problem, dominance in large samples is conceptually closer to Blackwell
dominance, as an objective criterion for comparing experiments that applies after a finite
number of repetitions, independently of the decision problem at hand.
Azrieli (2014) shows that the Moscarini-Smith order is a strict refinement of dominance
in large samples. Perhaps surprisingly, this conclusion is reversed under a modification
of their definition: when extended to consider all decision problems, including problems
with infinitely many actions, the Moscarini-Smith order over experiments coincides with
dominance in large samples.9
Our notion of dominance in large samples is prior-free. In contrast, several authors
(Kelly, 1956; Cabrales et al., 2013) have studied a complete ordering of experiments, indexed
by the expected reduction of entropy from prior to posterior beliefs (i.e. mutual information
between states and signals). We note that unlike Blackwell dominance, dominance in large
samples does not guarantee a higher reduction of uncertainty given any prior belief.10
4 Risk Aversion and Higher-Order Aggregate Dominance
In this section, we extend and characterize aggregate stochastic dominance for higher-order
stochastic orders. This is a natural extension which allows to study risk-aversion, prudence,
and higher-order risk attitudes in the context of repeated gambles. Our main application
is a new characterization of utility functions that display mixed risk-aversion, a large class
that encompasses most functional forms commonly used in applications.
9Consider the following extension of the Moscarini-Smith order: say that P dominates Q if for every
decision problem (with possibly infinitely many actions) there exists an N such that the expected utility
achievable from P⊕n is higher than that from Q⊕n whenever n ≥ N . Each Rényi divergence RθP (t)
corresponds to the indirect utility defined by a decision problem (see the proof of Theorem 2 in the
appendix), and for such decision problems the ranking over repeated experiments is independent of the
sample size n. We deduce that P dominates Q in this order only if P dominates Q in the Rényi order. By
Theorem 2, P must then dominate Q in large samples.
10To see this, consider the example in §3.5 with parameters α = 0.1 and β = 0. Then Proposition 1
ensures that the experiment P dominates Q in large samples. However, given a uniform prior, the residual
uncertainty under P is calculated as the expected entropy of posterior beliefs, which is 12 log(2) ≈ 0.346.
The residual uncertainty under Q is −α logα− (1− α) log(1− α) ≈ 0.325, which is lower.
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Recall that a random variable X dominates Y in kth-order stochastic dominance,
denoted by X ≥k Y , if E [φ(X)] ≥ E [φ(Y )] for every bounded and k-fold differentiable
function φ that is increasing and whose first k derivatives alternate in sign. That is, all
functions φ that satisfy (−1)nφ(n) ≤ 0 for all n ≤ k.
Extending Definition 1, we say that X kth-order dominates Y in the aggregate if for all
n large enough
X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥k Y1 + · · ·+ Yn.
where X1, . . . , Xn and Y1, . . . , Yn are i.i.d. copies of X and Y , respectively.
4.1 Second-Order Aggregate Dominance
The next two results characterize second-order aggregate stochastic dominance. We first
consider pairs of random variables with distinct expectation, and show that aggregate
stochastic dominance is equivalent to the unanimous ranking generated by all risk-averse
CARA preferences:
Theorem 3. Let X and Y be a generic pair of bounded random variables such that
E [X] 6= E [Y ]. Then the following are equivalent:
(i). LX(t) > LY (t) for all t ≤ 0.
(ii). X second-order dominates Y in the aggregate.
We complete our characterization by considering random variables with equal expecta-
tions:
Theorem 4. Let X and Y be a generic pair of bounded random variables such that
E [X] = E [Y ]. Then the following are equivalent:
(i). Var(X) < Var(Y ), LX(t) > LY (t) for all t < 0, and LX(t) < LY (t) for all t > 0.
(ii). X second-order dominates Y in the aggregate.
Hence, when X and Y have the same expected value, X dominates Y in terms of
second-order aggregate stochastic dominance if and only if X has lower variance and is
preferred to Y by any risk-averse CARA agent, while Y is preferred to X by all CARA
agents who are risk-loving.
One may wonder about the difference between the condition (i) here and the condition
(i) in Theorem 1. Note that first-order aggregate dominance is equivalent to LX(t) > LY (t)
for all t, whereas second-order aggregate dominance for zeor mean random variables requires
LX(t) to be smaller for t > 0. There is however no inconsistency, because the assumption
E [X] = E [Y ] in Theorem 4 already rules out the possibility that X1 + · · · + Xn can
first-order dominate Y1 + · · ·+Yn. Furthermore, in order for X1 + · · ·+Xn to second-order
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dominate Y1 + · · · + Yn, the former sum must be a mean-preserving contraction of the
latter. This suggests that the right-tail of X1 + · · · + Xn should be less spread-out, as
captured by LX(t) < LY (t) for t > 0, unlike in the case of first-order stochastic dominance.
4.2 Higher-Order Aggregate Dominance
Higher-order risk attitudes are properties of a decision maker’s preference over gambles
that, under expected utility, are captured by the sign of the higher-order derivatives of
the agent’s utility function u. Prudence (Kimball, 1990) is the requirement that the
third derivative of u is everywhere positive. Temperance (Kimball, 1991) requires the
fourth derivative of u to be everywhere negative. These properties can be extended to
higher orders. The importance of higher-order risk attitudes is due to their implications
for comparative statics in decision problems under risk, including precautionary saving
problems and decisions under background risk (Gollier, 2004).
The notion of k-th order stochastic dominance relates to higher-order risk attitudes in
the same way as second-order stochastic dominance relates to risk aversion: it is equivalent
to the unanimous preference by every individual whose utility function’s first k derivatives
exhibit alternating signs.
Large values of k capture increasingly nuanced properties of a decision maker’s prefer-
ences which might be difficult to test or to interpret.11 Our next result shows that when
considering a sum of a sufficiently large number of i.i.d. gambles, the distinction between
risk aversion and higher-order risk attitudes vanishes:
Proposition 4. Let X, Y be a generic pair of bounded random variables with E [X] 6= E [Y ].
Then the following are equivalent:
(i). X kth-order dominates Y in the aggregate, for some k ≥ 2.
(ii). X second-order dominates Y in the aggregate.
(iii). X ≥k Y , for some k ≥ 2.
Proof. To see that (i) implies (ii), suppose it holds for some n and k that X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥k
Y1 + · · ·+ Yn. Since the risk-averse CARA utility function u(x) = e−tx has derivatives that
alternate signs, by definition of ≥k we know that each risk-averse CARA agent prefers
X1 + · · ·+Xn to Y1 + · · ·+ Yn. Thus LX(t) > LY (t) for all t ≤ 0. Hence (ii) follows by
Theorem 3.
That (ii) implies (iii) follows by applying Theorem 4 in Fishburn (1980), which shows
that for bounded random variables X and Y with min[X] 6= min[Y ] and E [X] 6= E [Y ],
11For instance, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) show that a behavioral characterizations of higher-order
risk attitude is possible by considering bets defined by means of an ingenious construction. These bets are
progressively more complicated as k increases.
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X ≥k Y for some k ≥ 2 if and only if LX(t) > LY (t) for all t < 0.12 Since LX(t) > LY (t)
for all t < 0 holds by Theorem 3, (ii) implies (iii).
It follows from standard arguments that (iii) implies (i): Lemma 6 in the appendix
shows that if X ≥k Y , then the same holds if we consider the sum of any number of i.i.d.
replicas.
4.3 Mixed Risk Aversion
A utility function displays mixed risk aversion if it is increasing and its derivatives alternate
in sign. This key property is satisfied by most utility functions used in applications, as
emphasized by Brockett and Golden (1987) and Caballé and Pomansky (1996), who coined
the term. Despite its importance, mixed risk aversion remains a property that can be
difficult to interpret.
We apply the notion of aggregate stochastic dominance to provide a new behavioral
characterization of mixed risk aversion. As shown by the next proposition, this property is
equivalent to monotonicity with respect to aggregate second-order stochastic dominance.
Proposition 5. Let u : R→ R be a utility function. Then the following are equivalent:
(i). u displays mixed risk aversion.
(ii). E [u(X)] ≥ E [u(Y )] for every pair of bounded random variables X and Y such that
X second-order dominates Y in the aggregate.
The result provides a novel test for rejecting the hypothesis of mixed risk aversion: a
decision maker violates this property if they rank X as preferred to Y while, for a large
enough number of repetitions, any risk averse agent displays the opposite ranking.
The result follows by combining the characterization of Theorem 3 together with a
well-known representation theorem for mixed risk averse utilities. By Bernstein’s Theorem
(see, e.g., Choquet, 1969, Theorem 32.6), a utility function u : R→ R displays mixed risk
aversion if and only if there is a non-negative, finite Borel measure µ on R+, and coefficient
α, β ≥ 0 such that for all x ∈ R
u(x) = αx+ β −
∫ ∞
0
e−rx dµ(r). (20)
That is, every mixed risk averse utility is a mixture of CARA utility functions. It is then
clear that mixed risk aversion implies monotonicity with respect to aggregate stochastic
dominance. In the proof of Proposition 5 we establish the converse implication.
12In the notation used there, F,G ∈ P ∗ because X and Y are bounded, the condition G <0 F is satisfied
since min[X] > min[Y ], and the condition µF >L µG is satisfied because E [X] > E [Y ].
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5 Discussion
Additional Related Literature. Müller and Stoyan (2002) and Shaked and Shanthiku-
mar (2007) are comprehensive sources on stochastic orders. The ordering generated by the
functionals of the form LX(t) for t > 0, is known in the literature as the Laplace Transform
Order, and studied in Reuter and Riedrich (1981), Fishburn (1980), Alzaid et al. (1991)
and Caballé and Pomansky (1996), among others.
Samuelson’s paper yielded a large literature relating his original question to the analysis
of retirement decisions and insurance strategies (see, e.g., Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987;
Kimball, 1993; Gollier, 1996; Benartzi and Thaler, 1999). In addition, the paper spurred
a longstanding interest in behavioral economics (Rabin and Thaler, 2001) and finance
(Ross, 1999) on the extent to which preferences over gambles determine preferences over
the repetitions of gambles.13 Whereas Ross (1999) characterizes conditions on the utility
function such that every gamble (with positive expectation) will eventually be accepted
when compounded sufficiently many times, we take the opposite perspective and study
properties of a gamble so that it will eventually be accepted by every decision maker.
Notably, our analysis applies to non-expected utility, so long as the preference obeys some
version of stochastic dominance.
Compound Returns and CRRA Preferences. The notion of aggregate stochastic
dominance can be naturally extended to compare compound i.i.d. returns. Two random
returnsX and Y can be ranked by requiring that for every n large enough their compounded
i.i.d. returns satisfy
X1 × · · · ×Xn ≥1 Y1 × · · · × Yn. (21)
The resulting stochastic order amounts to aggregate stochastic dominance applied to
log(X) and log(Y ), and is characterized in terms of the certainty equivalents induced by
all constant relative risk aversion utilities.
Other Refinements of Stochastic Dominance. Hart (2011) proposes two complete
stochastic orders that refine second-order stochastic dominance: wealth-uniform dominance
and utility-uniform dominance. He further shows that dominance in these orders is
characterized by having a smaller riskiness index/measure given in Aumann and Serrano
(2008) and Foster and Hart (2009), respectively. But since these measures of risk are
distinct, an open question left by Hart (2011) is whether the two stochastic orders agree
on interesting cases beyond second-order stochastic dominance. In §K, we show that the
13For example, Rabin (2013) writes: “Expected-utility theory makes a powerful prediction that economic
actors don’t see an amalgamation of independent gambles as significant insurance against the risk of those
gambles; they are either barely less willing or barely more willing to accept risks when clumped together
than when apart”.
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two uniform dominance orders both refine our second-order aggregate dominance order,
which is characterized in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4.
Experiments for Many States. Our analysis leaves open a number of questions. The
most salient is the extension of Theorem 2, our characterization of domination in large
samples, to experiments with more than two states. A natural conjecture is that the ranking
of the (multidimensional) moment generating function of the log-likelihood ratio—which
translates to Rényi divergences in the two state case—characterizes this order for any
number of states. Unfortunately, our proof technique does not straight-forwardly extend
to this general case. In particular, we do not know how to extend the reduction of the
Blackwell order to first-order stochastic dominance (Proposition 2).14
Nonetheless, our analysis can be applied to any finite number of states when considering
the Lehmann order (Lehmann, 1988), which restricts attention to experiments that satisfy
the monotone likelihood ratio property, and to decision problems defined by single-crossing
utility functions.15 As Jewitt (2007) shows, Lehmann order is equivalent to Blackwell
order imposed on every pair of states. That is, a family of conditional distributions {Pθ}θ
dominates another family {Qθ}θ if and only if for every pair of states θ 6= θ′, the two-state
experiment with conditional distributions Pθ and Pθ′ Blackwell-dominates the experiment
with conditional distributions Qθ and Qθ′ . Hence our Theorem 2 provides a characterization
of large-sample Lehmann dominance for any number of states: P Lehmann-dominates Q
in large samples if and only if the conditional distributions {Pθ, Pθ′} dominate {Qθ, Qθ′}
in the Rényi order for every pair θ 6= θ′.
14The technical difficulty that arises when studying the Blackwell order for more than two states is
not new to the literature. As Jewitt (2007) writes, “the problem is the need to deal with a multivariate
stochastic dominance relation for a class of functions (convex) for which the set of extremal rays is too
complex to be of service.”
15The Lehmann order has applications to the study of information acquisition in strategic environments,
as illustrated by Persico (2000), Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) and Athey and Levin (2018). Quah and
Strulovici (2009) show that the Lehmann order continues to apply in a bigger class of payoff functions that
satisfying the “interval dominance order” property.
24
Appendix
A Uniform Large Deviations
We begin by reviewing some standard concepts from large deviations theory. For every
bounded random variable X we define ρX : R→ R+ as
ρX(a) = inf
t∈R
e−atMX(t).
whereMX(t) = E
[
etX
]
is the moment generating function ofX. We note that e−atMX(t) =
MX−a(t), hence ρX(a) is the infimum of the moment generating function of X − a.
We call a random variable non-degenerate if its distribution is not a point mass. In
this case, as is well known, MX is strictly log-convex, and if min[X] < a < max[X] then
MX−a(t)→∞ as |t| → ∞. It follows that for every a in the range min[X] < a < max[X]
the minimization problem in the definition of ρX , which is equivalent to minimizing the
strictly convex function −at+ logMX(t), has a unique solution. We denote this minimizer
by
tX(a) = argmin
t∈R
e−atMX(t).
LetKX(t) = logMX(t) denote the “cumulant generating function” of X. The first-order
condition gives that tX(a) solves
K ′X(t(a)) =
M ′X(t(a))
MX(t(a))
= a.
Note that MX(0) = 1 and M ′X(0) = E [X]. So K ′X(0) = E [X]. This, together with the
convexity of KX , shows that t(a) ≥ 0 if and only if a ≥ E [X].
Finally, for every min[X] < a < max[X] we define
σX(a) =
√
M ′′X(t(a))
MX(t(a))
− a2.
Using the above formula for t(a), we also have σX(a) =
√
K
′′
X(t(a)) which is strictly
positive whenever X is non-degenerate.
We will refer to quantities above as simply ρ(·), t(·) and σ(·) whenever X is unam-
biguously explicit from the context. The following technical lemma relates these functions
for a random variable X to the corresponding functions for its negative −X; it will allow
us to focus on large deviations “on one side” (of the expected value) and quickly deduce
analogous results for the other side.
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Lemma 2. Let X be a bounded and non-degenerate random variable. Then ρ−X(a) =
ρX(−a) for every a. If in addition min[X] < a < max[X] then t−X(a) = −tX(−a) and
σ−X(a) = σX(−a).
Proof. Notice that MX(t) = M−X(−t). Hence, given a, we have that for every t,
e−atM−X(t) = ea·(−t)MX(−t). It follows from this that ρ−X(a) = ρX(−a) and t−X(a) =
−tX(−a). σ−X(a) = σX(−a) then follows from the definition.
The main technical tool of this paper is the following lemma, due, in various forms,
to (Bahadur and Rao, 1960, Lemma 2) and to (Petrov, 1965, Theorems 5 and 6). It is a
sharp, quantitative large deviations estimate, which will be useful not only for proving our
asymptotic results above, but can also be used for estimating the number n of repetitions
required to achieve stochastic dominance.
Lemma 3. Let X be a bounded and non-degenerate random variable and let b > 0 satisfy
P [|X| ≤ b/2] = 1. Let X1, X2, . . . be i.i.d. copies of X.
Then for every E [X] ≤ a < max[X] and every n, it holds that
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ a · n] ≤ ρ(a)n. (22)
And for every E [X] ≤ a < max[X] and n ≥ (10b/σ(a))2 it holds that
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ a · n] ≥ C(a) · ρ(a)
n
√
n
(23)
where
C(a) = e
−10t(a)b · b
σ(a) ·
Inequalities similar to (22) and (23) apply to values of a that lie below the expectation
of X. Consider the case where min[X] < a ≤ E [X]. Then, by applying the inequality (23)
to the random variable −X and using Lemma 2, we obtain that for every n ≥ (10b/σX(a))2,
ρX(a)n = ρ−X(−a)n ≥ P [−X1 − · · · −Xn ≥ −a · n] = P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≤ a · n]
≥ e
−10t−X(−a)b · b
σ−X(−a) ·
ρ−X(−a)n√
n
= e
10tX(a)b · b
σX(a)
· ρX(a)
n
√
n
.
(24)
A corollary of this lemma is a lower estimate that is uniform over a ∈ [E [X],max[X]−ε].
Corollary 1. In the setting of Lemma 3, let A = [a, a] ⊂ [E [X],max[X]) be a given
interval. Then
CA = inf
a∈A
C(a) and nA = sup
a∈A
(10b/σ(a))2
are positive and finite, and hence for every a ∈ A and every n ≥ nA
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ a · n] ≥ CA · ρ(a)
n
√
n
· (25)
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Proof. Since t(a) solves K ′X(t(a)) = a and KX is strictly convex, t(a) must be strictly
increasing in a. It is thus continuous and bounded above on the compact set A. Similarly
σ(a) is continuous and strictly positive, so it is bounded above and away from zero on A.
Thus CA > 0 and nA <∞.
The next lemma is a refined version of Lemma 3, applicable to the regime of a that
vanishes with n.
Lemma 4. In the setting of Lemma 3, for every E [X] ≤ a < max[X] and every n it holds
that
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ an] ≤ 1 +
√
2pi · t(a)b√
2pi · σ(a)t(a) ·
ρ(a)n√
n
.
And for every E [X] ≤ a < max[X] and n ≥ 2[σ(a)t(a)]−2 it holds that
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ an] ≥ 1− 2
√
2pi · t(a)b
2
√
2pi · σ(a)t(a) ·
ρ(a)n√
n
.
This, and the previous lemma 3, are proved in the rest of this section.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3
We follow Bahadur and Rao (1960). For each a such that E [X] ≤ a < max[X], denote
pn(a) = P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ an].
Let Y a = X − a and let Fa be its cumulative distribution function. Consider, in addition,
a random variable Za whose c.d.f. is given by
G(z) = 1
ρ(a) ·
∫ z
−∞
et(a)·y dFa(y).
Note that G(∞) = 1 because by definition MY a(t(a)) = ρ(a).
More generally, the moment generating function of Za is given by
MZa(r) =
MY a(r + t(a))
ρ(a) =
MY a(r + t(a))
MY a(t(a))
It follows from M ′Y a(t(a)) = 0 that M ′Za(0) = 0, hence Za has mean 0. Moreover
σ(a)2 = M ′′Y a(t(a)) = M ′′Za(0) = Var(Za).
It is clear that Za has the same support as Y a, which, for the entire range of values of a
we consider, is contained in [−b, b]. Thus we further have
E
[
|Za|3
]
≤ b · E
[
(Za)2
]
= b · σ(a)2.
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Let Za1 , . . . , Zan be i.i.d. copies of Za, and define
Uan =
Za1 + · · ·+ Zan√
n · σ(a) .
Denote by Han(z) = P [Uan ≤ z] the c.d.f. of Uan . Then we can apply Lemma 2 in Bahadur
and Rao (1960) to obtain16
pn(a) = ρ(a)n ·
√
nσ(a)t(a) ·
∫ ∞
0
e−
√
nσ(a)t(a)z · (Han(z)−Han(0)) dz.
Clearly, Han(z)−Han(0) ≤ 1 for each z. So pn(a) ≤ ρ(a)n, which yields (22), also known as
the Chernoff bound.
In the other direction, for any z0 > 0 we have
pn(a) ≥ ρ(a)n ·
√
nσ(a)t(a) ·
∫ ∞
z0
e−
√
nσ(a)t(a)z · (Han(z0)−Han(0)) dz
= ρ(a)n · e−
√
nσ(a)t(a)z0 · (Han(z0)−Han(0)). (26)
By the Berry-Esseen Theorem17
Han(z0)−Han(0) ≥
∫ z0
0
1√
2pi
e−x2/2 dx− E
[|Za|3]
σ(a)3
√
n
≥
∫ z0
0
1√
2pi
e−x2/2 dx− b
σ(a)
√
n
.
Note that if z0 ≤ 1 then the first term on the right hand side is at least z0/5. Hence, if we
pick z0 = 10b/(σ(a)
√
n), and let n0 = (10b/σ(a))2, then for all n ≥ n0 we have that z0 ≤ 1
and so the above yields Han(z0)−Han(0) ≥ b/(σ(a)
√
n). Hence from (26) it holds for all
n ≥ n0 that
pn(a) ≥ ρ(a)n · e−
√
nσ(a)t(a)z0 · (Han(z0)−Han(0))
≥ ρ(a)n · e−10t(a)b · b
σ(a)
√
n
,
which shows (23).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
We initially proceed as in the proof of Lemma 3, arriving at
pn(a) = ρ(a)n ·
√
nσ(a)t(a) ·
∫ ∞
0
e−
√
nσ(a)t(a)z · (Han(z)−Han(0)) dz.
Let Φ denote the cdf of a standard Gaussian distribution. By the Berry-Esseen Theorem
Han(z)−Han(0) ≤ Φ(z)− Φ(0) +
b
σ(a)
√
n
·
16The lemma follows from the definitions and integration by parts. We do not repeat the details.
17In fact, to obtain a simpler expression we use some recent improvements in the estimate of the constant
in the Berry-Esseen Theorem by Tyurin (2010).
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Hence
pn(a) ≤ ρ(a)n ·
√
nσ(a)t(a) ·
∫ ∞
0
e−
√
nσ(a)t(a)z ·
(
Φ(z)− Φ(0) + b
σ(a)
√
n
)
dz.
Let c =
√
nσ(a)t(a). Then integration by parts implies
c
∫ ∞
0
e−cz · (Φ(z)− Φ(0)) dz = ec2/2 · Φ(−c) (27)
Standard bounds for Φ assert that
1
c
√
2pi
(
1− 1
c2
)
≤ ec2/2 · Φ(−c) ≤ 1
c
√
2pi
. (28)
We thus obtain from the upper bound and (27) that
pn(a) ≤ ρ(a)n
(
1√
2pi
√
nσ(a)t(a)
+ b
σ(a)
√
n
)
= ρ(a)n 1√
2pi
√
nσ(a)t(a)
(
1 +
√
2pit(a)b
)
.
In the other direction, applying Berry-Esseen again, we have
Han(z)−Han(0) ≥ Φ(z)− Φ(0)−
b
σ(a)
√
n
·
For n ≥ 2[σ(a)t(a)]−2, we have c ≥ √2, and so the lower bound in (28) implies
ec2/2Φ(−c) ≥ 1
2
√
2pic
.
It follows from this estimate and (27) that
pn(a) ≥ ρ(a)n
(
1
2
√
2pi
√
nσ(a)t(a)
− b
σ(a)
√
n
)
= ρ(a)n 1
2
√
2pi
√
nσ(a)t(a)
(
1− 2√2pit(a)b
)
.
B Proof of Proposition 3 and Theorem 1
It is not difficult to see that Proposition 3 implies Theorem 1. Indeed, to prove Theorem 1
we just need to show one direction, that LX(t) > LY (t) for all t implies X1 + · · · + Xn
dominates Y1 + · · ·+ Yn for large n. By Proposition 3,
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na]
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for every a ≤ E [Y ] and n ≥ N . Moreover, LX(t) > LY (t) for t ≤ 0 implies that
L−Y (t) > L−X(t) for t ≥ 0. Thus, applying Proposition 3 to the pair −Y and −X, we
obtain
P [−Y1 − · · · − Yn ≥ nb] ≥ P [−X1 − · · · −Xn ≥ nb]
for every b ≤ E [−X] and n ≥ N . Setting a = −b, this is equivalent to
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn > na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn > na]
for every a ≤ E [X]. Thus the inequality holds for all a when n is sufficiently large, and
Theorem 1 holds.
To prove Proposition 3, let b be a positive number so that X and Y are supported
on [−b/2, b/2]. Without loss of generality we assume X and Y are non-degenerate.18
Moreover, since LX(t) > LY (t) for all t ≥ 0, letting t→∞ yields max[X] ≥ max[Y ]. Since
they are unequal by assumption, we in fact have max[X] > max[Y ].
Denote by F ∗n (respectively G∗n) the c.d.f. of the sum of n i.i.d. copies ofX (respectively
Y ). We need to show 1−F ∗n(na) ≥ 1−G∗n(na) for a ≥ E [Y ] and n large. We divide the
proof into cases.
Case 1: a > max[Y ]. In this case G∗n(na) = 1, and so trivially 1−F ∗n(na) ≥ 1−G∗n(na)
for any n.
Case 2: E [X] ≤ a ≤ max[Y ]. Assume, without loss of generality, that max[Y ] > E [X].
Let A = [E [X],max[Y ]] and consider CA, nA as defined in Corollary 1, applied to the
random variable X. When a ∈ A we have e−atMX(t) > e−atMY (t) for every t > 0.
Since for a > E [X] we have tX(a) > 0, this implies
ρX(a) = MX−a(tX(a)) > MY−a(tX(a)) ≥ ρY (a).
But even if a = E [X], it still holds that ρX(a) = 1 = MY−a(0) > ρY (a) since tY (a) > 0.
Thus ρX(a) > ρY (a) whenever a ∈ A.
Now, Corollary 1 implies that for all a ∈ A and n ≥ nA,
1− F ∗n(an) ≥ CA · ρX(a)
n
√
n
, (29)
while Lemma 3 implies
1−G∗n(an) ≤ ρY (a)n. (30)
18Otherwise, we can find non-degenerate random variables X˜ and Y˜ with distributions close to X and Y ,
such that X dominates X˜ and Y˜ dominates Y in first-order stochastic dominance, and that LX˜(t) > LY˜ (t)
still holds for every t ≥ 0. The result of Proposition 3 for the pair X˜, Y˜ implies the corresponding result for
the pair X,Y .
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As ρX and ρY are continuous functions and ρX(a) > ρY (a) on A, the ratio ρX/ρY is
bounded below by 1 + ε for some ε > 0.19
Hence, for any n such that
CA >
√
n
(1 + ε)n and n ≥ nA
it follows from (29) and (30) that 1− F ∗n(an) > 1−G∗n(an) for all a ∈ A.
Case 3: E [Y ] ≤ a ≤ E [X]. By the Berry-Esseen Theorem there exist constants kX and
kY such that for all a, ∣∣∣∣F ∗n(na)− Φ(√n · a− E [X]σX
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ kX√n (31)∣∣∣∣G∗n(na)− Φ(√n · a− E [Y ]σY
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ kY√n.
where Φ denotes the cdf of a standard Gaussian distribution. Fix a0 = 12(E [X] + E [Y ]).
Since a0 > E [Y ] there exists an N such that n ≥ N implies
G∗n(na0) ≥ Φ
(√
n · a0 − E [Y ]
σY
)
− κY√
n
> 0.99− κY√
n
≥ 12 +
κX√
n
≥ F ∗n(n · E [X]).
where the first and the last inequalities follow directly from (31). Similarly, there exists N ′
such that n ≥ N ′ implies
F ∗n(na0) ≤ Φ
(√
n · a0 − E [X]
σY
)
+ κX√
n
< 0.01 + κX√
n
≤ 12 −
κY√
n
≤ G∗n(n · E [Y ]).
Hence for n ≥ max{N,N ′}, if a0 ≤ a ≤ E [X], then
G∗n(na) ≥ G∗n(na0) > F ∗n(n · E [X]) ≥ F ∗n(na).
Conversely, if E [Y ] ≤ a ≤ a0 then
F ∗n(na) ≤ F ∗n(na0) < G∗n(n · E [Y ]) ≤ G∗n(na).
Therefore 1− F ∗n(na) > 1−G∗n(na) holds for all a in this range. Proposition 3 follows.
C Preliminaries for Comparison of Experiments
We collect here some useful facts regarding the distributions of log-likelihood ratios induced
by an experiment. Let P = (Ω, P0, P1) be an experiment and let
Π = dP1/dP01 + dP1/dP0
19For E [X] ≤ a ≤ max[Y ], and ρY (a) = 0 if and only if a = max[Y ] and the distribution of Y has an
atom at max[Y ]. On the other hand, ρX is strictly positive on this interval.
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be the random variable corresponding to the posterior probability that θ equals 1. For
every A ⊆ [0, 1] we have
pi1(A) =
∫
Π∈A
dP1 =
∫
Π∈A
dP1
dP0
dP0 =
∫
Π∈A
Π
1−Π dP0
Thus
dpi1
dpi0
(p) = p1− p. (32)
Recall that pi = 12pi0 +
1
2pi1, so
dpi
dpi1
(p) = 12p (33)
We also observe that for every function φ that is integrable with respect to F1, defined
as in (10), ∫
R
φ(u) dF1(u) =
∫
R
φ(−v)e−v dF0(v). (34)
This implies that the moment generating function of F1
MF1(u) =
∫ ∞
−∞
etudF1(u)
satisfies
MF1(t) = MF0(−t− 1) (35)
Hence, in particular, MF1(−1) = 1.
C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Given an exponential distribution with support R+ and cdf H(x) = 1− e−x for all x ≥ 0,
F˜ and G˜ can be written as
F˜ (a) =
∫ ∞
0
F1(a+ u)dH(u) =
∫ ∞
0
F1(a+ u)e−udu
and similarly
G˜(a) =
∫ ∞
0
G1(a+ u)e−udu.
Consider the first part of the lemma. Suppose a ≥ b, then by assumption F1(a+ u) ≤
G1(a+ u) for all u ≥ 0, which implies F˜ (a) ≤ G˜(a).
For the second part of the lemma, we will establish the following identities:
F˜ (a) =
∫ ∞
−a
F0(v)e−vdv and G˜(a) =
∫ ∞
−a
G0(v)e−vdv. (36)
Given this, the result would follow easily: If F0(a) ≤ G0(a) for all a ≥ b, then the above
implies F˜ (−a) ≤ G˜(−a) for all a ≥ b.
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We now show how (36) follows from (34). We first observe that by taking φ(u) =
1(a,∞)(u) · e−u, (34) implies
F˜ (a) = F1(a) + ea
∫
(a,∞)
e−udF1(u) = F1(a) + eaF0((−a)−) (37)
where F0((−a)−) denotes the left limit of F0 evaluated at −a. Moreover, taking φ to be
the indicator function of (−∞, a] implies
F1(a) =
∫ ∞
−a
e−vdF0(v).
Integration by parts leads to
F1(a) =
∫ ∞
−a
e−vdF0(v) = −eaF0((−a)−)−
∫ ∞
−a
F0(v)e−vdv
Hence by (37), we obtain
F˜ (a) =
∫ ∞
−a
F0(v)e−vdv
as desired.
D Proof of Theorem 2
Throughout the proof, we use the notation introduced in §3.6 and §3.7 and further discussed
in §C, as well as the notation related to large deviation estimates introduced in §A.
We first show that (i) implies (ii). As discussed in the main text, the comparison of
Rényi divergences between two experiments is independent of the number of repetitions.
Thus it suffices to show that the Rényi order refines the Blackwell order.
For t > 1, the function v1(p) = 2pt(1− p)1−t is strictly convex. Thus it is the indirect
utility function induced by some decision problem. Moreover, it is straightforward to check
that ∫ 1
0
v1(p) dpi(p) = exp((t− 1)R1P (t)),
which is a monotone transformation of the Rényi divergence. Thus, experiment P yields
higher expected payoff in this decision problem (with indirect utility v) than Q only if
R1P (t) > R1Q(t).
For t ∈ (0, 1), we consider the indirect utility function v2(p) = −2pt(1− p)1−t, which is
now convex due to the negative sign. Observe similarly that∫ 1
0
v2(p) dpi(p) = − exp((t− 1)R1P (t))
is again a monotone transformation of the Rényi divergence. So P yields higher payoff in
this decision problem only if R1P (t) > R1Q(t).
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For t = 1, we consider the indirect utility function v3(p) = 2p log( p1−p), which is strictly
convex. Since ∫ 1
0
v3(p) dpi(p) = R1P (1),
P yields higher payoff only if R1P (1) > R1Q(1).
Summarizing, the above family of decision problems show that P Blackwell-dominates
Q only if R1P (t) > R1Q(t) for all t > 0. Since the two states are symmetric, we also have
R0P (t) > R0Q(t) for all t > 0. This shows P dominates Q in the Rényi order.
We now show that (ii) implies (i). The assumptions that R0P (1) > R0Q(1) and that
R1P (1) > R1Q(1) are, in terms of the notation introduced in (11), is equivalent to
E [G0] < E [F0] and E [G1] < E [F1],
where, with slight abuse of notation, given a cdf H we denote by E [H] the expectation of
a random variable with distribution H.
Let X,X1, . . . , Xn be i.i.d. and distributed according to F1 and let Y, Y1, . . . , Yn be i.i.d.
and distributed according to G1. By (17) and (18), the assumption that RθP (t) > RθQ(t)
for all positive t 6= 1 is equivalent to having MX(t) > MY (t) for t > 0 and t < −1, and
MX(t) < MY (t) for t ∈ (−1, 0). In particular, LX(t) > LY (t) for all t > −1.
By Proposition 2, it suffices to show that for n large,
X1 + · · ·+Xn − E ≥1 Y1 + · · ·+ Yn − E.
where E is an independent, positive, exponential random variable with density e−x. That
is, we need to show for n large and all a ∈ R,
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn − E ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn − E ≥ na] (38)
We consider a number of cases.
Case 1: a ≥ E [G1]. The random variables X and Y satisfy the conditions of Proposi-
tion 3. Thus, for every n large enough and every a in this range it holds that
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na]
Hence F ∗n1 (na) ≤ G∗n1 (na), and so the first statement of Lemma 1 applied to F ∗n1 , G∗n1
implies
F˜ ∗n(na) ≤ G˜∗n(na),
which implies (38).
34
Case 2: a ≤ −E [G0]. Here we repeat the argument of the previous case, but applied to
F0 and G0, instead of F1 and G1. The hypothesis that MF1(t) < MG1(t) for all t < −1 is
equivalent, by (35), to MF0(t) > MG0(t) for all t > 0. Moreover E [F0] > E [G0], and so
the same conditions that applied in the previous case apply here. Thus there exists N such
that for n ≥ N it holds that
F ∗n0 (na) ≤ G∗n0 (na),
for every a ≥ E [G0]. Hence the second statement of Lemma 1 implies
F˜ ∗n(na) ≤ G˜∗n(na)
for all a ≤ −E [G0].
Case 3: −E [G0] ≤ a ≤ E [G1]. Here we will still show (as in case 1) that
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na],
which would imply the result via Lemma 1.
Recall that tY (a) satisfies K ′Y (tY (a)) = a. Observe that K ′Y (0) = E [G1] ≥ a and
K ′Y (−1) = K ′G1(−1) = −K ′G0(0) = −E [G0] ≤ a.
Thus by convexity ofKY , we have tY (a) ∈ [−1, 0]. Since E [F1] > E [G1] and E [F0] > E [G0],
it follows that tX(a) ∈ (−1, 0).
Denote A = [−E [G0], E [G1]]. By (24), we have for all n ≥ ( 10bmina∈A σY (a))2 and a ∈ A,
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ 1− ρX(a)n
and
P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na] ≤ 1− C(a)√
n
ρY (a)n,
where
C(a) = e
10tY (a)b · b
σY (a)
is strictly positive when a ∈ A.
We now argue that ρX(a) < ρY (a) for a in this range. Indeed, since MY (t) > MX(t)
for t ∈ (0, 1), and since (as is true for any distribution of a log-likelihood ratio) MX(0) =
MX(−1) = MY (0) = MY (−1) = 1, we have
ρY (a) = e−atY (a) ·MY (tY (a)) ≥ e−atY (a) ·MX(tY (a)) ≥ e−atX(a) ·MX(tX(a)) = ρX(a).
But the first inequality holds equal only if tY (a) ∈ {−1, 0}, in which case the second
inequality must be strict, because tX(a) = argmint e−at ·MX(t) is strictly between −1 and
0.
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Therefore ρX(a) < ρY (a) for a ∈ A. By continuity,
γ := max
a∈A
ρX(a)
ρY (a)
is strictly below 1. We therefore conclude that
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na]
for every n large enough to satisfy
γn <
mina∈AC(a)√
n
.
This completes the proof.
E Proof of Proposition 1
It is easily checked that the condition R1P (1/2) > R1Q(1/2) reduces to√
α(1− α) >
√
β(12 − β) +
1
4 . (39)
Since the experiments form a generic pair, by Theorem 2, we just need to check dominance
in the Rényi order. Equivalently, we need to show
(12 − β)
rβ1−r + (12 − β)
1−rβr + 12 < (1− α)
rα1−r + (1− α)1−rαr, ∀0 < r < 1; (40)
(12 − β)
rβ1−r + (12 − β)
1−rβr + 12 > (1− α)
rα1−r + (1− α)1−rαr, ∀r < 0 or r > 1;
(41)
β · ln( β1
2 − β
) + (12 − β) · ln(
1
2 − β
β
) > α · ln( α1− α) + (1− α) · ln(
1− α
α
). (42)
To prove these, it suffices to consider the α that makes (39) hold with equality.20 We
will show that the above inequalities hold for this particular α, except that (40) holds
equal at r = 12 . Let us define the following function
∆(r) := (12 − β)
rβ1−r + (12 − β)
1−rβr + 12 − (1− α)
rα1−r − (1− α)1−rαr.
When (39) holds with equality, we have ∆(0) = ∆(12) = ∆(1) = 0. Thus ∆ has roots
at 0, 1 as well as a double-root at 12 . But since ∆ is a weighted sum of 4 exponential
functions plus a constant, it has at most 4 roots (counting multiplicity).21 Hence these
20It is clear that inequalities are easier to satisfy when α increases in the range [0, 12 ].
21This follows from Rolle’s theorem and an induction argument.
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are the only roots, and we deduce that the function ∆ has constant sign on each of the
intervals (−∞, 0), (0, 12), (12 , 1), (1,∞).
Now observe that since 2β < α ≤ 12 , it holds that 1/2−ββ > 1−αα > 1. It is then easy
to check that ∆(r) → ∞ as r → ∞. Thus ∆(r) is strictly positive for r ∈ (1,∞). As
∆(1) = 0, its derivative is weakly positive. But recall that we have enumerated the 4 roots
of ∆. So ∆ cannot have a double-root at r = 1, and it follows that ∆′(1) is strictly positive.
Hence (42) holds.
Note that ∆′(1) > 0 and ∆(1) = 0 also implies ∆(1− ε) < 0. Thus ∆ is negative on
(12 , 1). A symmetric argument shows that ∆ is positive on (−∞, 0) and negative on (0, 12).
Hence (40) and (41) both hold, completing the proof.
F Necessity of Genericity Assumption
Here we present examples to show that Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 do not hold without
the genericity assumption.
Gambles. The following is an example where LX(t) > LY (t) for all t ∈ R, but X does
not dominate Y in the aggregate because max[X] = max[Y ]. Fix any q ∈ (0, 1), and
consider
X =

10, w.p. q
2, w.p. 1−q2
0, w.p. 1−q2
; Y =

10, w.p. q
1, w.p. 2(1−q)3
−1, w.p. 1−q3
Let Xˆ be the random variable that takes values 2 and 0 with equal probabilities; note
that Xˆ is distributed as X, conditional on X 6= 10. Similarly define Yˆ to take value 1
w.p. 2/3 and value −1 w.p. 12 . It is easy to check that Xˆ1 + Xˆ2 first-order stochastically
dominates Yˆ1 + Yˆ2. As a result, LXˆ(t) > LYˆ (t) for all t. Since
MX(t) = q · e10t + (1− q) ·MXˆ(t),
we conclude that LX(t) > LY (t) for all t.
Nonetheless, we now show that X does not dominate Y in the aggregate. For each n,
consider P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ 10n− 9]. In other for this to happen, either every Xi takes
value 10, or all but one Xi equals 10 and the remaining one equals 2. Thus
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ 10n− 9] = qn + nqn−1 · 1− q2 .
Similarly we have
P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ 10n− 9] = qn + nqn−1 · 2(1− q)3 .
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Since the latter probability is larger, X1 + · · ·+Xn does not first-order dominate Y1 + · · ·+
Yn.22
Nonexistence of a Generator. The above example shows that aggregate stochastic
dominance does not admit a generator. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that V was a
family of functions φ : R→ R with the property that for all bounded random variables X
and Y , X first-order dominates Y in the aggregate if and only if E [φ(X)] ≥ E [φ(Y )] for
all φ ∈ V .
Let X, Xˆ, Y and Yˆ be defined as in the previous paragraph. Since Xˆ dominates Yˆ in
the aggregate, then it must hold that E
[
φ(Xˆ)
]
≥ E
[
φ(Yˆ )
]
for all φ ∈ V . Hence,
E [φ(X)] = (1− q)E
[
φ(Xˆ)
]
+ qφ(10) = (1− q)E
[
φ(Yˆ )
]
+ qφ(10) ≥ E [φ(Y )],
implying that X dominates Y , a contradiction.
Experiments. Consider the experiments P and Q described in §3.5. Fix α = 14 and
β = 116 , which satisfy (39). Then by Proposition 1, P dominates Q in large samples.
But similar to the preceding example, we will perturb these two experiments by adding
another signal realization (to each experiment) which strongly indicates the true state is 1.
The perturbed conditional probabilities are given below:
P˜ :
θ x0 x1 x2 x3
0 ε 116
1
2
7
16 − ε
1 100ε 716
1
2
1
16 − 100ε
Q˜ :
θ y0 y1 y2
0 ε 14
3
4 − ε
1 100ε 34
1
4 − 100ε
If ε is a small positive number, then by continuity P˜ still dominates Q˜ in the Rényi
order. Nonetheless, we show below that P˜⊕n does not Blackwell-dominate Q˜⊕n for any n
and ε > 0.
To do this, let p := 100n−1100n−1+1 be a threshold belief. We will show that a decision maker
whose indirect utility function is (p− p)+ strictly prefers Q˜⊕n to P˜⊕n. Indeed, it suffices to
focus on posterior beliefs p > p; that is, the likelihood-ratio should exceed 100n−1. Under
Q˜⊕n, this can only happen if every signal realization is y0, or all but one signal is y0 and
the remaining one is y1. Thus, in the range p > p, the posterior belief has the following
distribution under Q˜⊕n:
p =

100n
100n+1 w.p.
1
2(100n + 1)εn
3·100n−1
3·100n−1+1 w.p.
n
8 (3 · 100n−1 + 1)εn−1
22Related, a slightly modification of this example shows that even if X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥1 Y1 + · · ·+ Yn for
all large n, this does not imply that X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥1 X1 + · · ·+Xn−1 +Yn for all large n. Indeed, suppose
that Y = 9 (instead of 10) w.p. q in this example, then Theorem 1 applies and shows that X dominates Y
in the aggregate, but P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ 10n− 9] < P [X1 + · · ·+Xn−1 + Yn ≥ 10n− 9].
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Similarly, under P˜⊕n the relevant posterior distribution is
p =

100n
100n+1 w.p.
1
2(100n + 1)εn
7·100n−1
7·100n−1+1 w.p.
n
32(7 · 100n−1 + 1)εn−1
Recall that the indirect utility function is (p − p)+. So Q˜⊕n yields higher expected
payoff than P˜⊕n if and only if
n
8 (3·100
n−1+1)n−1·
(
3 · 100n−1
3 · 100n−1 + 1 − p
)
>
n
32(7·100
n−1+1)n−1·
(
7 · 100n−1
7 · 100n−1 + 1 − p
)
.
That is,
4(3·100n−1+1)·
(
3 · 100n−1
3 · 100n−1 + 1 −
100n−1
100n−1 + 1
)
> (7·100n−1+1)·
(
7 · 100n−1
7 · 100n−1 + 1 −
100n−1
100n−1 + 1
)
.
The LHS is computed to be 8·100n−1100n−1+1 , while the RHS is
6·100n−1
100n−1+1 . Hence the above inequality
holds, and it follows that P˜⊕n does not Blackwell dominate Q˜⊕n.
G Proof of Theorem 3
If X second-order dominates Y in the aggregate, then, by considering risk-averse CARA
utility functions, we obtain that LX(t) > LY (t) for all t < 0; the strict inequality is because
these utility functions are strictly concave. By continuity we thus have LX(0) ≥ LY (0),
which implies E [X] ≥ E [Y ]. Since by assumption they are unequal, we in fact have
E [X] > E [Y ]. Hence (ii) implies (i).
To show (i) implies (ii), suppose LX(t) > LY (t) for all t ≤ 0. As in the proof of
Theorem 1, We assume without loss of generality that X and Y are non-degenerate, and
denote by F ∗n (resp. G∗n) the c.d.f. of the sum of n i.i.d. copies of X (resp. Y ). Furthermore,
by shifting X and Y by a constant, we can assume E [X] = µ and E [Y ] = −µ for some
positive number µ.
To prove second-order stochastic dominance, we need to show that for n large enough
and for every x ∈ R it holds that∫ x
−∞
G∗n(t)− F ∗n(t) dt ≥ 0 (43)
We again consider a few cases.
Case 1: x ≤ 0. In this case Proposition 3 applied to the random variables −Y and −X
implies G∗n(x) ≥ F ∗n(x) for all x ≤ nµ. Hence (43) holds too.
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Case 2: x ≥ 0. Note that, as can be shown by integration by parts,∫ ∞
−∞
G∗n(t)− F ∗n(t) dt = nE [X]− nE [Y ] = 2nµ
Hence ∫ x
−∞
G∗n(t)− F ∗n(t) dt = 2nµ−
∫ ∞
x
G∗n(t)− F ∗n(t) dt
= 2nµ−
∫ ∞
x
(1− F ∗n(t))− (1−G∗n(t)) dt
≥ 2nµ−
∫ ∞
0
1− F ∗n(t) dt (44)
Now, again using integration by parts we have that∫ ∞
0
1− F ∗n(t) dt = nµ+
∫ 0
−∞
F ∗n(t) dt
= nµ+
∫ 0
nmin[X]
F ∗n(t) dt ≤ nµ+ n · |min[X]| · F ∗n(0).
By the Chernoff bound (i.e., (22) in Lemma 3), F ∗n(0) ≤ ρ−X(0)n. Since ρ−X(0) < 1, for
n large enough we have that the above is at most 32nµ. Applying this estimate to (44)
yields ∫ x
−∞
G∗n(t)− F ∗n(t) dt ≥ 12nµ
for all x ≥ 0, and our proof is complete.
H Proof of Theorem 4
We first show (ii) implies (i). Observe that by assumption, E [X1 + · · ·+Xn] = E [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn]
for each n. Thus X1 + · · ·+Xn second-order stochastically dominates Y1 + · · ·+ Yn if and
only if the latter is a mean-preserving spread of the former. Thus, for every strictly convex
function φ : R→ R (not necessarily increasing), it holds that
E [φ(X1 + · · ·+Xn)] < E [φ(Y1 + · · ·+ Yn)].
Choosing φ(x) = x2 and using E [X1 + · · ·+Xn] = E [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn], we deduce that
Var(X1 + · · ·+Xn) < Var(Y1 + · · ·+ Yn), and so Var(X) < Var(Y ). Moreover, choosing
φ(x) = etx implies that MX(t) < MY (t) for all t 6= 0. This is equivalent to LX(t) < LY (t)
for all t > 0 and LX(t) > LY (t) for all t < 0, as we desire to show.
Below we prove that (i) implies (ii). Since LX(t) < LY (t) for all t > 0, taking t→∞
yields max[X] ≤ max[Y ] by continuity. But since X and Y are generic, we in fact have
max[X] < max[Y ]. Similarly we have min[X] > min[Y ]. We also assume without loss
of generality that E [X] = E [Y ] = 0. Thus X and Y are bounded, zero mean random
variables satisfying the following conditions:
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(i). min[X] > min[Y ].
(ii). max[X] < max[Y ].
(iii). Var(X) < Var(Y )
(iv). MX(t) < MY (t) for all t 6= 0.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, denote by F ∗n (resp. G∗n) the c.d.f. of the sum of n
i.i.d. copies of X (resp. Y ). Let b > 0 be a number such that X and Y are supported on
[−b/2, b/2].
To prove (ii) we need to show that for n large enough and for every x ∈ R it holds that
W (x) :=
∫ x
−∞
G∗n(y)− F ∗n(y) dy ≥ 0. (45)
Since E [X] = E [Y ], integration by parts shows that W (x) = 0 for x sufficiently large.
Thus we also have W (x) =
∫∞
x F
∗n(y)−G∗n(y) dy. The above inequality reduces to∫ ∞
x
F ∗n(t)−G∗n(t) dt ≥ 0. (46)
We will show that (46) holds for all x ≥ 0. The case of x ≤ 0 follows by applying the same
argument to −X and −Y , which also satisfy the above four conditions.
As before, we write x = na and consider a few cases.
Case 1: max[X] < a. In this range F ∗n = 1, and hence F ∗n ≥ G∗n point-wise.
Case 2: ε ≤ a ≤ max[X] , with ε > 0 chosen in case 3 below. Note that LY (t) > LX(t)
for all t > 0, so the random variables Y and X almost satisfy the assumptions of Proposition
3, except that LY (0) = LX(0) (which equals their common expected value). However,
since we have a ≥ ε, we can follow the analysis in the proof of Proposition 3 and deduce
that ρY (a) > ρX(a) in this range. The result of Proposition 3 thus gives
1−G∗n(na) ≥ 1− F ∗n(na)
for all n large enough (depending on ε) and a ≥ ε. The integral in (46) is thus positive in
this range.
Case 3:
√
1
2 Var(X)
logn
n ≤ a ≤ ε. Define rX(a) = log ρX(a) (and rY analogously). It
follows from Lemma 4 that
1− F ∗n(na) ≤ exp (n · rX(a)) · 1 +
√
2pitX(a)b√
2piσX(a)tX(a)
√
n
,
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and that
1−G∗n(na) ≥ exp (n · rY (a)) 1− 2
√
2pitY (a)b
2
√
2piσY (a)tY (a)
√
n
,
provided that
n ≥ [σY (a)tY (a)]−2.
By Lemma 5 below r′X(0) = −tX(0) = 0 and
r′′X(0) = −t′X(0) = −
1
K ′′X(0)
= − 1Var(X) .
Hence by Taylor expansion, we can write
rX(a) = rX(0) + r′X(0) +
1
2r
′′
X(0)a2 +O(a3) = −
1 +O(ε)
2 Var(X)
for 0 ≤ a ≤ ε; similarly for rY (a).
Note that tX(0) = 0, so tX(a) = O(ε). Also, σX(0) = Std(X) (the standard deviation
of X), which implies σX(a) = (1 + O(ε)) Std(X). Moreover, t′X(0) = 1Var(X) > t
′
Y (0), so
tX(a) > tY (a) for 0 ≤ a ≤ ε whenever ε is sufficiently small. Plugging all of these estimates
into the above inequality for F ∗n, we have
1− F ∗n(na) ≤ exp
(
−D(ε)a
2n
2 Var(X)
)
1
2
√
2piVar(X)n · tY (a)D(ε)
, (47)
where D(ε) < 1 is a shorthand for 1−O(ε), which approaches 1 as ε→ 0.
Similarly,
1−G∗n(na) ≥ exp
(
− a
2n
2D(ε) Var(Y )
)
D(ε)
2
√
2piVar(Y )n · tY (a)
, (48)
provided that
n ≥ [σY (a)tY (a)]−2. (49)
Considering the ratio between (47) and (48), we obtain
1−G∗n(na)
1− F ∗n(na) ≥ exp
(1
2
(
D(ε)
Var(X) −
1
D(ε) Var(Y )
)
a2n
) Std(X)
2 Std(Y ) .
Denote
VXY =
1
4
( 1
Var(X) −
1
Var(Y )
)
, (50)
which is positive since Var(X) < Var(Y ). We now choose ε small enough so that
1
2
(
D(ε)
Var(X) −
1
D(ε) Var(Y )
)
> VXY > 0.
42
For this ε, it thus holds that
1−G∗n(na)
1− F ∗n(na) ≥ exp
(
VXY a
2n
) Std(X)
2 Std(Y ) .
Since we are considering the case that a2 ≥ 12 Var(X) lognn we have that
1−G∗n(na)
1− F ∗n(na) ≥ exp
(1
2VXY Var(X) logn
) Std(X)
2 Std(Y ) .
This is larger than one for n large enough. So we still have F ∗n(na) ≥ G∗n(na) point-wise.
Lastly, we need to verify the condition (49). As we noted above, σY (0) = Std(Y ),
tY (0) = 0 and t′Y (0) = 1/Var(Y ). So for ε small enough and all a such that 12 Var(X)
logn
n ≤
a2 ≤ ε2 we have σY (a) = (1 +O(ε)) Std(Y ) and tY (a) = (1 +O(ε))a/Var(Y ). Hence
[σY (a)tY (a)]−2 ≤ 2 Var(Y )
a2
≤ 4 Var(Y )Var(X)
n
logn,
And so condition (49) will hold for all n sufficiently large.
Case 4:
√
1
n ≤ a ≤
√
1
2 Var(X)
logn
n . By the Berry-Esseen Theorem
F ∗n(na) ≥ 1√
2pi
∫ a√n/Std(X)
−∞
e−x2/2 dx− k√
n
and
G∗n(na) ≤ 1√
2pi
∫ a√n/Std(Y )
−∞
e−x2/2 dx+ k√
n
,
where k is a constant depending only on the distribution of X and Y . Hence
F ∗n(na)−G∗n(na) ≥ 1√
2pi
∫ a√n/Std(X)
a
√
n/Std(Y )
e−x2/2 dx− 2k√
n
.
Since e−x2/2 is decreasing in this range we can lower bound the integrand by its right limit,
yielding
F ∗n(na)−G∗n(na) ≥
( 1
Std(X) −
1
Std(Y )
)
a
√
n · e−a2n/(2 Var(X)) − 2k√
n
. (51)
Applying the assumption 1n ≤ a2 ≤ 12 Var(X) lognn yields
F ∗n(na)−G∗n(na) ≥
( 1
Std(X) −
1
Std(Y )
)
n−1/4 − 2k · n−1/2, (52)
which is again positive for all n large enough.
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Case 5: 0 ≤ a ≤
√
1
n . Recall that we defined
W (x) =
∫ ∞
x
F ∗n(y)−G∗n(y) dy.
From cases 1-4, we have shown that for y ≥ √n, F ∗n(y)−G∗n(y) ≥ 0 point-wise. Moreover,
from (52) we in fact have
F ∗n(y)−G∗n(y) ≥ cn−1/4
for n large enough and
√
n ≤ y ≤
√
1
2 Var(X)n logn, where c is a positive constant
independent of n. Integrating this estimate over the range of y to which it applies, we
deduce
W (
√
n) ≥
∫ √ 1
2 Var(X)n logn
√
n
F ∗n(y)−G∗n(y) dy = cn1/4.
On the other hand, for y ∈ [0,√n], it follows from 51 that
F ∗(x)−G∗n(x) ≥ − 2k√
n
.
So for any x ∈ [0,√n],
W (x) =
∫ ∞
x
F ∗n(y)−G∗n(y) dt
=
∫ √n
x
F ∗n(y)−G∗n(y) dy +W (√n)
≥ − 2k√
n
√
n+W (
√
n)
= −2k + cn1/4
which is positive for n large enough. This completes the proof that W (x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ 0,
and the theorem follows.
H.1 Additional Lemma
Lemma 5. Let X be a bounded, zero mean random variable, and define rX(a) = log ρX(a).
Then r′X(0) = −tX(0) = 0 and r′′X(0) = −t′X(0) = −1/Var(X).
Proof. We suppress the subscript X in this proof. Observe that r(a) = inftK(t)− at. So
by the envelope theorem, r′(a) = −t(a). Since t(E [X]) = 0, we deduce r′(0) = −t(0) = 0.
Moreover, we have r′′(a) = −t′(a). Now recall that t(a) satisfies K ′(t(a)) = a, and so
t′(a) = 1K′′(t(a)) . But from K(t) = logE
[
etX
]
it is easy to deduce K ′′(0) = Var(X). Hence
r′′X(0) = −t′X(0) = −1/Var(X) as desired.
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I Omitted Lemma in the Proof of Proposition 4
To prove (iii) implies (i), we establish the following lemma:
Lemma 6. Suppose X ≥k Y for some k ≥ 1. Then for each n and i.i.d. replicas X1, . . . , Xn
of X and Y1, . . . , Yn of Y , it holds that
X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥k Y1 + · · ·+ Yn.
Proof. We first show that if X ≥k Y , then X + Z ≥k Y + Z whenever Z is independent
of both X and Y . Indeed, by definition we need to show E [u(X + Z)] ≥ E [u(Y + Z)] for
any u whose first k derivatives have alternating signs. The assumption that X ≥k Y shows
E [u(X + z)] ≥ E [u(Y + z)] for every realization z, since u(· + z) also has k derivatives
that alternate signs. Integrating over z then yields the claim. Repeatedly applying this
result, we obtain
X1+· · ·+Xn ≥k X1+· · ·+Xn−1+Yn ≥k X1+· · ·+Xn−2+Yn−1+Yn ≥k · · · ≥k Y1+· · ·+Yn.
This proves the lemma.
J Proof of Proposition 5
That (i) implies (ii) is immediate: wheneverX dominates Y in the aggregate, LX(t) ≥ LY (t)
for all t ≤ 0. Thus E
[
−e−rX
]
≥ E
[
−e−rY
]
for all r ≥ 0, and E [u(X)] ≥ E [u(Y )].
It remains to show the negation of (i) implies the negation of (ii). Suppose we are
given a utility function u /∈ C. Without loss we can assume u is increasing and concave;
otherwise we can find X ≥2 Y such that E [u(X)] < E [u(Y )], which is stronger than the
negation of (ii).23 In particular, we will assume u is continuous.
Equip the space of functions RR with the product topology (i.e. topology of pointwise
convergence), and let C ⊂ RR be the set of MRA utility functions. It is immediate that C
is a convex cone. It is also closed, because the set of functions that are Laplace Transforms
of non-negative measures—that is, the set of functions of the form
∫
e−rx dµ(r)—is closed
under pointwise convergence (Curtiss, 1942, Theorem 2).
Since RR is locally convex, and since C is a closed convex cone, it follows from the
Hahn-Banach Separation Theorem that there is a continuous linear functional λ : RR → R
and a constant δ > 0 such that for all v ∈ C it holds that
λ(u) < −δ < 0 ≤ λ(v).
As a continuous linear functional on RR with the product topology, λ is of the form
λ(v) =
n∑
i=1
αiv(xi)− βiv(yi)
23Recall that the usual stochastic order implies the aggregate stochastic order.
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for some n ≥ 1, non-negative (αi), non-negative (βi), and real numbers (xi) and (yi).24
Equivalently, there are finitely supported random variables X and Y , and constants
A,B ≥ 0, such that
λ(v) = A · E [v(X)]−B · E [v(Y )].
Since C contains all constant functions, we conclude that A = B. Without loss of generality,
we can therefore assume that A = B = 1.
Now recall λ(u) < −δ, and so
E [u(X)] < E [u(Y )]− δ. (53)
Also, λ(v) ≥ 0 for all v ∈ C, and so for any such v
E [v(X)] ≥ E [v(Y )].
This implies LX(t) ≥ LY (t) for all t ≤ 0.
To complete the proof, let ε > 0 and define Z = Y − ε. Since u is continuous, and using
(53), we can choose ε small enough to satisfy E [u(X)] < E [u(Z)]. On the other hand, X
and Z form a generic pair and LX(t) ≥ LY (t) > LZ(t) for all t ≤ 0. Thus by Theorem 3,
X second-order dominates Z in the aggregate. This leads to the negation of (ii).
K Connection to Other Stochastic Orders
Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Foster and Hart (2009) propose two criteria for measuring
the riskiness of a gamble. They focus on random variables X with E [X] > 0 and
P [X < 0] > 0. The Aumann-Serrano riskiness index is the unique positive number RAS(X)
such that
E
[
e
− X
RAS(X)
]
= 1.
On the other hand, the Foster-Hart measure of riskiness is the unique positive number
RFH(X) such that
E
[
log
(
1 + X
RFH(X)
)]
= 0.
Hart (2011) recognizes that these indices induce two complete orderings over gambles
that refine second-order stochastic dominance. That is, we can define X to dominate
Y if and only if RAS(X) ≤ RAS(Y ) (or RFH(X) ≤ RFH(Y ), respectively). He provides
behavioral characterizations of these orders, which are called “uniform-wealth dominance”
and “uniform-utility dominance.”
In what follows, we show that if LX(t) ≥ LY (t) for all t ≤ 0, then X is less risky than
Y according to both Aumann-Serrano and Foster-Hart. This, together with one direction
24In other words, λ(v) is a fixed linear combination of the value of the function v at certain fixed points.
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of Theorem 3, then proves that the two uniform dominance orders in Hart (2011) both
refine our second-order aggregate dominance order.
To show RAS(X) ≤ RAS(Y ), let a denote 1RAS(X) and b denote
1
RAS(Y ) . By definition
we have MX(−a) = 1. But since LX(−a) ≥ LY (−a) by assumption, we obtain MY (−a) ≥
MX(−a) = 1. From MY (−a) ≥ 1, MY (0) = MY (−b) = 1, and the strict convexity of
MY (t), we can conclude that b ≤ a. Thus
RAS(X) = 1/a ≤ 1/b = RAS(Y ).
To show RFH(X) ≤ RFH(Y ), we similarly denote c = 1RFH(X) and d =
1
RFH(Y ) . By
definition,
E [log(1 + cX)] = 0 = E [log(1 + dY )].
Consider the utility function u(x) = log(1 + dx). Observe that for x > −1d , u(x) has
derivatives that alternate signs. By Bernstein’s theorem, u(x) can be written as a mixture
of linear functions and exponential functions {−e−tx}0≤t≤∞. Since by assumptionMX(t) ≤
MY (t) for all t ≤ 0, we deduce that E [u(X)] ≥ E [u(Y )].25 In other words,
E [log(1 + dX)] ≥ E [log(1 + dY )] = 0.
Now observe that the function g(λ) = E [log(1 + λX)] is strictly concave in λ, and g(0) =
g(c) = 0 ≤ g(d). Hence d ≤ c. It follows that
RFH(X) = 1/c ≤ 1/d = RFH(Y ).
25Note that LX(t) ≥ LY (t) for t → −∞ implies min[X] ≥ min[Y ]. Thus whenever E [log(1 + dY )] is
defined, so is E [log(1 + dX)].
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